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1. Introduction 
The Irish economy enjoyed a long period of sustained growth from roughly 1994 onward, with a 
corresponding growth in wealth creation and employment1. Yet, in 2008, Ireland recorded a substantial 
                                                          
* Il presente contributo rappresenta la rielaborazione di un intervento tenuto al convegno di studi dal titolo: "Crisi 
economica, istituzioni democratiche e decisioni di bilancio", svoltosi a Pisa il 3-4 dicembre 2015. Il convegno ha 
rappresentato uno dei momenti conclusivi dell’unità locale pisana (coordinata dal Prof. Rolando Tarchi) della 
ricerca PRIN 2010-2011 “Istituzioni democratiche e amministrazioni d’Europa: coesione e innovazione al tempo della crisi 
economica” (responsabile scientifico la Prof.ssa Alessandra Pioggia – Università di Perugia).  
Tale attività è poi proseguita nell’ambito del progetto di ricerca di ateneo (PRA 2016) finanziato dall’Università di 
Pisa, su “Stato di crisi, poteri di governo, decisioni di bilancio e tutela dei diritti sociali negli stati UE”, coordinato dal Prof. 
Roberto Romboli. 
Lo scritto, prima di essere inviato alla Rivista è stato sottoposto a referaggio da parte dei responsabili scientifici 
nazionale e locale e da revisori esterni selezionati dal responsabile dell’unità. 
This article takes into account the legal development occurred until March 2016. It is the product of a joint 
reflection. However, Sections 2. and 3.1. have been written by Delia Ferri and Sections 3.2. and 4. and have been 
written by Charles O’Sullivan, while Sections 1. and 5. have been written jointly. 
1 PJ O’CONNELL, Astonishing Success-Economic Growth and the Labour Market in Ireland, ILO, Geneva, 2000; F. 
BARRY, The Celtic Tiger Era: Delayed Convergence or Regional Boom?, in Quarterly Economic Commentary, Economic and 
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public deficit, which reached 14.3% of GDP in 2009, the highest in the EU, and experienced a rapid 
deterioration in its public finances, a collapse in the housing market and construction sector, and a 
liquidity crisis within the banking system2. The rate of unemployment rose from just under 5% in January 
2007 to more than 15% by January 2012 and unemployment in the construction sector rose by 60% in 
just four years from 2008 to 2012, all of which led to an unprecedented social crisis3. The number of 
people relying on unemployment benefits rose to 326,000 in January 2009, the highest monthly level 
since records began in 19674. 
Given this context, in 2008, the Irish executive chose to guarantee the value of all personal deposits in 
Irish banks5, before extending this to all debts accrued by national financial institutions. While these steps 
initially sated the market’s fears regarding the Irish economy’s stability, the fact that the liabilities of these 
institutions were more significant than the Government initially anticipated, meant that by 2010, the 
interest rates being charged on Irish Government bonds had risen to an unsustainable level. Hence, after 
publicly denying the existence of any plans for outside help, the Irish Minister for Finance and Governor 
of the Central Bank chose to accept a full EU financial “rescue package” (also known as “bailout” or 
support scheme) from the “Troika” of the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF)6. Ireland’s support scheme amounted to €85 billion over four years 
from November of 2010 to December of 2013. The European Commission was proscribed the primary 
role of ensuring Ireland’s compliance with an eventual successful exit from the support scheme on behalf 
of the EU. 
                                                          
Social Research Institute, Summer (2002), pp. 84-91; S. KINSELLA, Is Ireland really the role model for austerity?, in 
Cambridge Journal of Economics, Vol. 36, Issue 1, pp. 223-235. 
2 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Ireland’s economic crisis: how did it happen and what is being done about it?, available at 
ec.europa.eu/ireland/economy/irelands_economic_crisis/index_en.htm. On the banking crisis see B. CLARKE – N. 
HARDIMAN, Crisis in the Irish Banking System, available at 
www.ucd.ie/geary/static/publications/workingpapers/gearywp201203.pdf. See also R. KITCHIN – C. O’CALLAGHAN – 
M. BOYLE – J. GLEESON, Placing neoliberalism: the rise and fall of Ireland’s Celtic Tiger, in Environment and Planning A, 
n.6/2012, pp. 1302-1326; E. O’LEARY, Reflecting on the Celtic Tiger: Before, During and After, Department of 
Economics, UCC (2010). 
3 Inter alia P. KIRBY – M. MURPHY, Towards a Second Republic, Dublin, 2011; G. KELLY – A. NOLAN, The impact 
of the crisis on fundamental rights across Member States of the EU- Country report on Ireland, available at 
www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2015/510016/IPOL_STU(2015)-510016_EN.pdf.  
4 G. KELLY – A. NOLAN, The impact of the crisis on fundamental rights …, op.cit.  
5 Credit Institutions (Financial Support) Bill 2008 (Act No. 45/2008) (Ir.), available at 
www.oireachtas.ie/documents/bills28/bills/2008/4508/b4508d.pdf.  
6 R. O’GORMAN, The Irish “Bail-Out” and Cuts to Social Protection Spending – the Case for a Right to a Subsistence Minimum 
in EU Law, in German Law Journal, n.4/2014, available at www.germanlawjournal.net/. See also C. MACMAOLAIN, 
Ramifications of the EU/IMF Loan to Ireland for the Financial Services Sector and for Irish Law and Society, in European Public 
Law, n.3/2011. 
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Ireland’s continued enjoyment of its support scheme was conditional on several factors, including that 
specific economic and political reforms be carried out. This was first established in a Decision of the 
Council7 on the same, before being expanded upon in a series of Memorandums of Understanding 
(MoUs)8 signed between the Irish Government and the “Troika”, which outlined in greater detail the 
range of necessary reforms to be implemented. On the one hand, these reforms focused on brining the 
State’s overall expenditure in line with its current revenue streams: key austerity measures, mainly 
introduced through annual budgetary laws, included social protection expenditure reductions, the 
reduction of public service employment numbers, public service wages and pensions, cuts in expenditure 
including on goods and services, and a reduction in public capital expenditure9. On the other hand, Irish 
society and the political establishment sought to make a clear symbolic break with its past by proposing 
wide-ranging constitutional and political reforms. Austerity was therefore to be counterbalanced by wide-
ranging structural and rights-based constitutional and political reforms. In May, 2012 the Irish electorate 
voted in favour of the 30th Amendment to the Constitution of Ireland, which inserted a new Article 
29.4.10 within the Irish Constitution (Bunracht na hEireann)10. This provision allowed the ratification of 
the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (the so 
called “Stability Treaty”)11. The ratification of this Treaty substantially consolidated the Irish commitment 
to overcome the financial crisis. Further to a period of severe “austerity” measures, in December 2013, 
                                                          
7 Council Implementing Decision 2011/77, On Granting Union Financial Assistance to Ireland, 2011 O.J L30/34. 
8 The Troika and the Irish authorities agree 12 separate memoranda of understanding and the Troika would carry 
out 12 Review Missions to Ireland.  
9 The MoUs contained a more specific figure of €750 million in savings resulting from overall reforms in the 
welfare system including reform of unemployment and social assistance benefits. 
10 As outcome of the Irish Supreme Court in Crotty (Crotty v. An Taoiseach & Others [1987] 1 IR 713), every 
subsequent amendment of the European Treaties has to be put to the Irish electorate and, once passed, has resulted 
in new articles being added to the Irish Constitution (for a more detailed account see ex multis: M. FORED – D. 
LEONARD, Constitutional law of Ireland, Dublin, 2013, pp. 229 et seq. Ireland’s relationship with the EU is 
constitutionally provided for across Articles 29.4.2 – 29.4.9. On the EU referendum see J. O’MAHONY, Ireland’s 
EU Referendum Experience, in Irish Political Studies, n.4/2009, pp. 429-446. For a more general overview see also B. 
LAFFAN – J. O’MAHONY, Ireland in the European Union, Basingstoke, 2009. The referendum on the Stability 
Treaty saw the addition of Article 29.4.10 into the Constitution. The provision reads as follows: “The State may 
ratify the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union done at Brussels 
on the 2nd day of March 2012. No provision of this Constitution invalidates laws enacted, acts done or measures 
adopted by the State that are necessitated by the obligations of the State under that Treaty or prevents laws enacted, 
acts done or measures adopted by bodies competent under that Treaty from having the force of law in the State”.  
11 Thirtieth Amendment of the Constitution (Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic 
and Monetary Union) Bill 2012. The Stability Treaty, otherwise known as the Fiscal Compact or Fiscal Compact 
Treaty, is an intergovernmental treaty that has now been signed and ratified by 25 states. It is a stricter application 
and interpretation of the previous Stability and Growth Pact signed by all EU Member States, and imposes fines 
on a signatory state where they do not maintain a “balanced budget”. Although it is an intergovernmental treaty, 
its purpose, form, and requirements arise from EU law. On the Stability Treaty see ex pluribus S. PEERS, The 
Stability Treaty: Permanent Austerity or Gesture Politics?, in European Constitutional Law Review, n.8/2012, pp. 404-441. 
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Ireland became the first European country to formally exit the EU/IMF bailout programme12. After two 
years, the Irish economy has certainly seen a marked improvement by some measurements. However, a 
full recovery has not yet been achieved13.  
In light of these circumstances, this chapter discusses the main reform measures introduced in Ireland as 
a consequence of the economic crisis. First, it discusses in a general fashion the reform process initiated 
after 2009, with a particular emphasis on the role played by the Irish executive within this process, in 
order to establish the overarching socio-legal context. The chapter highlights the economic, social and 
political reforms undertaken, with a particular emphasis on the coalition government in power between 
2011 and February of 2016 due to its almost singular role in shaping this period. It goes on to address 
the main austerity measures and their impact in terms of social rights. It first considers social rights in a 
general fashion, before examining workers’ rights in particular, and how these shed light on the overall 
changes made to social rights during this period. Then the chapter critically examines the Constitutional 
Convention, its purpose and operation, as well as its most notable success: the Marriage Equality 
referendum. Finally, the advancement of civil rights in Ireland during this period is discussed. It is 
ultimately argued that the reforms advanced raised unique questions, with perhaps the most significant 
being to what extent have these reforms focused on issues of representation and identity politics at the 
expense of substantive issues of equality. This contribution also attempts to investigate whether the Irish 
government has held unnecessary referendums on civil rights in order to not only protect itself politically, 
but to put forward the appearance of substantive change, whilst undermining or ignoring fundamental 
social rights. Ultimately, the contribution argues that, whilst austerity measures were successfully 
implemented from 2009 onwards, the political and constitutional changes made failed to address either 
the substantive or procedural deficiencies highlighted by Irish society at large.  
 
2. Setting the Scene: Putting the Bailout in Context 
2.1. Economic Crisis, Political Stagnation and Executive Dominance 
From an economic perspective, it is difficult to attribute the harsh economic crisis that Ireland 
experienced to any one particular cause or prevailing issue. The reality is that the contributing factors 
were numerous, and date back to the early part of the decade, if not before. However, one of the largest 
failures was a property market bubble which developed in the early 2000s, financed by the domestic 
                                                          
12 J. ZARROLI, Ireland exits bailout program, but economy still on the mend, 15 December 2013, Press Release, available 
at www.npr.org/2013/12/16/251410113/ireland-exits-bailout-program-but-economy-still-on-themend.  
13 J. FITZGERALD, Ireland’s Recovery from Crisis, in CESifo Forum n.15(2)/2014, pp. 8-13, available at www.cesifo-
group.de/ifoHome/infoservice/News/2014/04/news-20140414-CESifo-Forum-2-2014.html.  
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financial sector. In particular, since 2002 a “degree of speculation crept into the housing market”14. As a 
consequence of a sizeable number of people purchasing houses as an investment strategy, the link 
between asset prices and their value became disconnected. Individuals underestimated the risk involved 
in entering the property market, and the demand for housing as well as loan approvals rose dramatically. 
Thus, in connection to the property boom, the financial sector adopted a very “relaxed” strategy in how 
it issued and approved mortgages. The over-lending to property developers, persons buying ancillary 
homes for investment purposes and those buying a “family home” caused an increase in indebtedness 
“mainly for asset purchase[s]” within the financial sector, and left the sector vulnerable to the large risk 
of default in the event of a negative shock to the economy15. The collapse of the US financial firm Lehman 
Brothers and the international crisis made it apparent that Irish banks risked insolvency16. Thus, as 
outlined above, the Irish government, through the Credit Institutions (Financial Support) Bill 200817, 
guaranteed deposit-holders and bondholders. In November 2009, the Irish government established the 
National Asset Management Agency (NAMA)18 to purchase all development-related loans from the 
banks. These measures effectively socialized the crippling financial losses of the private sector, resulting 
in an enormous public debt liability19. 
Undoubtedly the property bubble was at the heart of the Irish financial crisis. When this bubble finally 
burst, it inflicted ever increasing damage to both the financial sector and the Irish economy as a whole, 
and was in turn worsened by the international financial crisis. However, as noted by Larkin, the crisis was 
more generally the result of “shortsighted policies related to banking, housing and taxation”, and was 
deeply linked to the peculiar political culture within Ireland20. More pragmatically, Hardiman and 
Dellepiane note that “[t]he main source of the Irish banks’ problems was their over-exposure to property-
based loans and the close personal as well as financial links between bankers, property developers, 
builders, and politicians, especially in the dominant Fianna Fáil party”. It is apparent that the absence of 
                                                          
14 K.P.V. O’SULLIVAN – T. KENNEDY, What caused the Irish banking crisis?, in Journal of Financial Regulation and 
Compliance, n.3/2010. 
15 S. DELLEPIANE – N. HARDINMAN, Governing the Irish Economy: A Triple Crisis, available at 
www.ucd.ie/geary/static/publications/workingpapers/gearywp201103.pdf.  
16 S. DELLEPIANE – N. HARDINMAN, Governing the Irish Economy, op.cit. 
17 See supra ft. 5.  
18 National Asset Management Agency Act 2009 (Act No. 34/2009) (Ir.), available at 
www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2009/act/34/enacted/en/pdf. The National Asset Management Agency Act 2009 (the 
NAMA Act) was passed into law on 22 November 2009 and came into operation on 21 December 2009. 
19 C. MACMAOLAIN, Ramifications of the EU/IMF Loan to Ireland for the Financial Services Sector and for Irish Law and 
Society, in European Public Law, n.17(3)/2011. 
20 C. LARKIN, The Irish Exit - A Warning for Europe (June 5, 2014), available at ssrn.com/abstract=2588443 or 
dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2588443. See also N. HARDIMAN, Bringing Domestic Institutions back into an Understanding of 
Ireland's Economic Crisis, in Irish Studies in International Affairs, n.21/2010. 
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traditional left and right parties,21 and the large-scale dominance of Fianna Fáil (FF), who successfully 
positioned itself as a catch-all party even prior to achieving full independence22, has certainly contributed 
to a peculiar form of political stagnation. Any changes made to the social and political platforms of the 
governing party was largely internal, a situation quite analogous to the Italian experience where Fabbrini 
notes that “alteration(s) (were made) at the margins of the coalition (in favour of a more rightist or leftist 
orientated centre parties)”23. 
From a legal perspective, the fact that Fianna Fail was in power almost continuously between 1932 and 
2011, and that it went on to enjoy electoral support of between 40% and 50% from the 1930s until the 
2008 financial crisis24, has led to what Siaroff calls as a “fusion of the executive and legislature”25. 
Although, Ireland follows a traditional tripartite model of government based on the separation of powers, 
and can be classified as a parliamentary democracy26, with a ceremonial head of State, a “cabinet 
dominance over both the legislature and the policy process” is quite evident27. In the same vein, Morgan 
notes that “private members’ bills”, i.e. bills that are brought to parliament by a non-government 
parliamentarian for general approval, were only accepted and passed into law in 6 instances between 1937 
to 1988, and all of these arising in the 1950s28. All other laws and the “shortsighted policies” that caused 
the crisis and tried to solve it originated from the executive. The longa manus of the executive is also quite 
                                                          
21 Maintaining the status quo has been a prevailing idea within the Irish political sphere and through this, the way in 
which laws come into being. Both Fianna Fáil (FF) and Fine Gael (FG) evolved from within the structures of Sinn 
Féin (SF), diverging merely in how they viewed the Anglo-Irish Treaty. The Labour Party equally failed to capitalise 
on setting the agenda for any such social and political revolution.  
22 P. MAIR – M. MARSH, Political Parties in Electoral Markets in Post-War Ireland, in P. MAIR – W. C. MÜLLER – 
F. PLASSER (eds.), Political Parties and Electoral Change: Party Responses to Electoral Market, London, 2004, p. 235. 
23 S. FABBRINI, Political Change Without Institutional Transformation: What Can We Learn from the Italian Crisis of the 
1990s?, in International Political Science Review n.2/2000, April 2000, p. 179. 
24 With the electoral weakness of the left, FF demonstrated the ability to capitalise on the emerging median voter, 
quickly positioning itself as the catch-all party. See J. COAKLEY – M. GALLAGHER, Politics in the Republic of 
Ireland, 4th Edition, Oxon, 2009, at Figure 2.1 
25 A. SIAROFF, Varieties of Parliamentarianism in the Advanced Industrial Democracies, in International Political Science 
Review, n.4/2003, 457. 
26 Some scholars have classified Ireland as a semi-presidential system (R. ELGIE, Semi-presidentialism: Concepts, 
Consequences and Contesting Explanations, in Political Studies Review, n.2(3)/2004) its constitutional structure is that of a 
parliamentary democracy, with a ceremonial head of state (the President), with the executive branch chosen based 
on the composition of the lower house of parliament (the Dáil), which is directly elected using the PRSTV 
(proportional representation by single-transferable vote) electoral system. The upper house of parliament or Senate 
(the Seanad), is elected using a variety of electoral procedures but none of which are based on universal suffrage. 
These two house of parliament combined and the parliamentary structure itself are formally referred to as the 
houses of the Oireachtas or simply the Oireachtas. The Irish judiciary is elected by the executive but is functionally 
and procedurally independent, in line with the judiciaries of democratic states more generally. See L. MEZZETTI, 
The Irish Form of Government: A Merely Apparent Semi-Presidentialism, in G.F. FERRARI – J. O’DOWD (eds.), 75 years 
of the Constitution of Ireland: An Irish-Italian Dialogue, Dublin, 2014. 
27 A. SIAROFF, Varieties of Parliamentarianism in the Advanced Industrial Democracies, cit. 
28 D.G. MORGAN, Constitutional Law of Ireland, 2nd Edition, Dublin, 1990, p. 103 and 231. 
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evident in the activity of the NAMA. Whilst this was established as a statutory body corporate and its 
powers, functions and governance arrangements derive from the NAMA Act 200929, the Minister of 
Finance has issued several written guidelines and directions, which are binding, to NAMA. 
 
2.2. The Bailout and the Reform Process 
The IMF-EU package, negotiated by the government of Fianna Fail and the Green Party, allowed Ireland 
to receive a loan under certain conditions. First, the measures required by the MoUs entailed “fiscal 
consolidation”: taxes were to be raised, carbon, property and water taxes were to be introduced, whilst 
personal income tax bands and credits were to be lowered. Secondly, and most notably for the purpose 
of this analysis, as already highlighted above, public expenditure, including social protection expenditure 
and numbers of public sector workers, was to be reduced. These budgetary cuts were to go hand in hand 
with a more comprehensive structural reform of the labour market, including legislative changes to 
remove restrictions to trade and competition in sheltered sectors, including the legal and medical 
professions. Thirdly, in the MoUs the Troika and the Irish Government agreed on a series of financial 
sector reforms to be carried out, including a reorganisation of the banking sector, with smaller banks 
being merged with larger “pillar” banks. 
When the Fine Gael (FG) and Labour Party (Labour)30 coalition came into power in 201131, they carefully 
adhered to the terms previously negotiated into the MoUs. It is potentially arguable that this was an 
unavoidable choice, with a renegotiation of these conditions being difficult, if not impossible. However, 
it should be noted that the bailout programme gave the government room to manoeuvre in how it sought 
to achieve these reductions in public expenditure, and that how such social and economic cuts were to 
be implemented was ultimately in the hands of the Irish executive. It was of course the government that 
gave effect to the MoUs by translating them into further concrete economic and financial policies. The 
FG and Labour coalition government put forward its interpretation of the necessary cuts in public 
expenditure, through a reduction in the national minimum wage, cuts in social welfare payments, a 
reduction in overall public service staff numbers, a reformed pension scheme for new entrants to the 
public service, substantive pay cuts, reform of the welfare system and the introduction of water metering. 
Key fiscal and austerity measures were adopted by means of the governmental budgets (passed by 
                                                          
29 See supra ft. 18. 
30 B. FARRELL, Labour and the Irish Political Party System: A Suggested Approach to Analysis, in Economic and Social 
Journal, n.(4)(1)/1970, p. 487. 
31 On the decline of Fianna Fail and on the 2011 election see M. MARSHA – S. MIKHAYLOV, Economic voting in 
a crisis: The Irish election of 2011, in Electoral studies, 2012. 
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legislative means through parliament), which are, by their very nature, managed by the government32. 
Notably, with regards to social welfare, in the Budgets of 2010 and 2011, all working age social welfare 
payments including the maternity benefit, and the One Parent Family Payment (OPFP) were cut33. 
Reductions in the overall reimbursement cost of drugs and medicines provided through the public health 
system were also introduced. The 2012 Budget also cut social assistance entitlements related to disability 
and carer’s allowances. The Rent Supplement (RS), a support measure for low income tenants in the 
private sector, was reduced together with the capital budget for social housing construction. Austerity 
measures were backed by Finance Acts, which must be passed by the Oireachtas within four months of 
the Budget, but whose content is largely tied to the government’s design34. Other acts (again executive 
driven), complemented the spending cuts adopted through the budget. The Financial Emergency 
Measures in the Public Interest Act 201035 introduced severe cut in public sector pensions. The 
subsequent Financial Emergency Measures in the Public Interest (Amendment) Act 201136 provided for 
the reduction of judicial pay and pensions, further reduced the pay of members of the Government 
(already cut in 2010). The Social Welfare and Pensions Act 201137 introduced the first changes to the 
pension schemes. Then, the Public Service Pensions (Single Scheme and other Provisions) Act 201238 
introduced a new single pension scheme for all new entrants to the public service and, in particular, raised 
the minimum pension age to 66 as well as making certain changes affecting existing public service pension 
arrangements. In the same vein, the Financial Emergency Measures in the Public Interest Act 201339 
provided for a reduction in remuneration for public servants earning more than €65,000, and a further 
reduction in public service pensions. The Act also provided for a suspension of incremental remuneration 
progression until 2016 for all public servants40. 
However, the FG and Labour coalition government did seek to break with the policies of their 
predecessors by initiating a process of wide-ranging constitutional reforms. During the 2010 electoral 
campaign, FG focused more on structural issues of representation and the way in which democracy is 
executed, whilst Labour proposed a Constitutional Convention which would draft and adopt an entirely 
                                                          
32 In March 2009, an emergency budget imposed pay cuts for all public servants. The subsequent December 2009 
budget again cut public sector pay. The subsequent budgets followed on this line.  
33 See at www.budget.gov.ie/Budgets/2010/Summary.aspx#SocialWelfare, and www.budget.gov.ie/Budgets/ 2011/2011.aspx.  
34 Art. 28 IC. 
35 (Act No. 38/2010) (Ir.), available at www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2010/act/38/enacted/en/html.  
36 (Act No. 39/2011) (Ir.), available at www.irishstatutebook.ie/pdf/2011/en.act.2011.0039.pdf.  
37 (Act No. 9/2011) (Ir.), available at www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2011/act/9/enacted/en/pdf.  
38 (Act No. 9/2011) (Ir.), available at www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2012/act/37/enacted/en/html. 
39 (Act No. 18/2013) (Ir.), available at www.oireachtas.ie/documents/bills28/acts/2013/a1813.pdf.  
40 These applied unless public servants were covered by a collective agreement modifying the terms of the 
incremental suspension which has been registered with the Labour Relations Commission. 
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new constitutional text for the Irish people, bringing about a “Second Republic”41. It outlined that 
“Labour will ask a people’s convention to draw up a new Constitution setting out the aspirations, the 
values and the rules that Irish people want to live by now”42. The underlying assumption was that this 
new constitution would not only directly engage with society at large, but specifically engage a select 
number of citizens in choosing a new, normative direction on behalf of wider society. The inevitable 
compromise reached within their combined “Programme for Government”43 when both parties entered 
government together, sought to strike a balance between these two otherwise competing objectives. 
Structural issues would be put to popular plebiscite, whilst a Constitutional Convention would examine 
discreet social issues, with the outcomes being referred back to the executive branch with the possibility 
for further referendums. Since constitutional amendment represents perhaps the most symbolically or 
normatively significant method of law reform available within a nation state, it is not surprising that both 
FG and the Labour adopted this particular symbolism, as the normative values of the state in turn provide 
the framework within which legislative acts are interpreted and signals the way in which society views 
itself.  
Overall, the reform process in Ireland was twin-tracked: on the one hand, budget cuts and austerity 
measures were to be implemented, whilst on the other, constitutional reforms would be proposed and 
put to popular plebiscite. These two “components” were viewed as two sides of the same coin. The 
whole process would however be entirely “executive driven”. The conditions laid down in the MoUs had 
been agreed by the executive, and then implemented by the executive itself. Beside these austerity 
measures, the constitutional reform process was to mark a political shift following the economic crisis of 
2008-2010. As it will discussed further in Section 4, the Constitutional Convention was a “creation” of 
the government and its task were kept quite limited and solidly controlled by the executive.  
All in all, the financial collapse and the subsequent bailout functioned as a catalyst for both austerity 
measures and constitutional change, with the latter’s final result however being far more modest than 
originally envisaged. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
41 Labour Manifesto 2011, One Ireland: Jobs, Reform, Fairness, (2011) www.labour.ie/download/pdf/labour_ 
election_manifesto_2011.pdf. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Available at www.citizensinformationboard.ie/publications/relate/relate_2011_03.pdf.  
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3. The First Track: Austerity and the Successful Degradation of Economic and Social Rights in 
Ireland 
3.1. Austerity and Social Rights 
The category of so called “social rights” is very broad and quite blurred. A common element of social 
rights however is that these either directly necessitate State intervention, and more particularly economic 
redistribution or the State acting to redress structural imbalances in favour of social institutions (e.g. the 
promotion of organised labour organisations). 
The Irish Constitution (Bunreacht na hÉireann - IC) does include several implicit or explicit mentions of 
such rights existing, in Articles 4244, 4345, and 4446. In addition, the Preamble to the Constitution refers 
to the State being founded on the principles of “justice, prudence and charity”47. Whilst charity might 
imply that redistribution should take place within the private sphere, i.e. driven by philanthropy and 
charitable donations rather than through the centralised role of the State as an intermediary, these three 
principles combined arguably necessitate the State engaging in some form of redistributive acts48. It is of 
course somewhat unreasonable to assume that personal charity alone can ensure the wellbeing of all 
citizens, and in particular, those suffering from some form of social and/or economic exclusion49. 
                                                          
44 Article 42 deals with the right to education, and Art. 42(3)(2) necessitates that the State ensure children receive 
a minimum level of education (moral, intellectual and social). Section 4 of Article 42 specifically necessitates that 
the State provide free primary education to all children, and whilst Article 42 is overall balanced against the rights 
of parents as the primary educators of society, this does not diminish that overall the State is obligated to provide 
social rights of a particular kind. 
45 Article 43 deals with the right to private property. Whilst it does adopt a primarily Lockean/liberal view of 
private property as being inviable, Section 2, subsections (1) and (2) both qualify this right as being subject to the 
exigencies of the common good and in particular, social justice. Therefore whilst it might lean towards one specific 
constitutional tradition in its overall construction, Article 43 does allow for, if not necessitate that redistribution 
take place. 
46 Whilst Article 44 deals primarily with the right to non-discrimination on religious grounds, Section 2, Subsection 
4 allows the State to redistribute or allocate monies to denominational schools so that children can be educated in 
line with their faith, and on the understanding that the right to hold religious beliefs does not always correspond 
with the right to practice or preserve, which may require positive discrimination of one kind or another. 
47 The Preamble of the Constitution is of course non-judicable, but can and has often been used in interpreting 
the positive obligations with regards to social rights and in discovering additional rights which are not expressly 
contained within the Constitutional text (the “unenumerated rights”). 
48 Article 45(1) of the Irish Constitution also explicitly mentions charity in establishing the social policy objectives 
of the State in a normative sense. These objectives are couched in redistributive terms, or in placing an emphasis 
on the State to provide for citizens which further supports this same interpretation. 
49 It should further be noted that following independence, there was a rhetorical emphasis placed upon social rights 
and the potential development of the welfare state which would suggest that charity alone was insufficient and not 
the intent of these provisions. “[T]he social system at present [...] is not anything like what it ought to be [...] It 
ought to be our constant endeavour to try to remedy it.” (M. MOYNIHAN (ed.), Speeches and statements by Eamon 
de Valera 1917-73, Dublin and New York, 1980, p. 326); and “mak[ing] the resources and wealth of Ireland 
subservient to the needs and welfare of all the people of Ireland” (Memorandum regarding constitution of Fianna Fâil, 9 
Nov. 1926 (U.C.D. Archives, MacEntee Papers, P 67/443)) This of course did not necessarily translate into the actual 
social welfare system created after this point. 
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Further, Article 45.1 IC establishes that the State should “strive to promote the welfare of the whole 
people”, with subsection 2 outlining general instruments which can make this possible. In spite of this 
framework, social rights have never been the core of political action. As noted by Nolan, “[l]ow taxes, 
the reliance on non-state actors to deliver ESR-related goods and services, and the adoption of a market-
based model to healthcare, including heavy reliance on private health insurance were key features of Celtic 
Tiger Ireland (and beyond)”50. In addition, the Superior Courts51 have been extremely reticent to establish, 
or even engage with of any such rights in a substantive sense. Scanlon52 for example, established that there 
is no constitutional right to social welfare, effectively relegating the determination of social welfare claims 
to the legal interpretation of entitlements under the relevant acts themselves. Sinnott53, TD54, and O’Reilly55 
simply serve as three further examples where even in a general sense, the Courts were somewhat unwilling 
to engage in any kind of redistributive measures, or to hold the government to account in realizing these 
nascent social rights provisions within the constitution itself. For example, in Sinnot, the Supreme Court 
overturned the High Court’s earlier decision, which had granted the right to primary education on the 
basis of need rather than age, and confirmed that the right to primary education ends at 18 years of age. 
The Court therefore interpreted Ar. 42 IC quite strictly in that instance. Having determined that the 
obligation to provide education was owed only to those under 18 years of age, the Court claimed that 
only in “rare and exceptional” circumstances can the Court make a mandatory order to protect 
constitutional rights such as this56.  
In all three of these cases, the Superior Courts withdrew itself, through the invocation of the separation 
of powers, and avoided engaging in matters of distributive justice. This method of interpreting the 
Constitution may be based on a particular interpretation of the opening paragraph of Article 45 IC, which 
establishes that “social policy” is the sole remit of the Oireachtas in its legislative capacity. It therefore 
establishes that the objectives contained within it, most of which clearly place an emphasis on the 
                                                          
50 A. NOLAN, Welfare Rights in Crisis in the Eurozone: Ireland, in C. KILPATRICK – B. DE WITTE (eds.), Social 
Rights in Times of Crisis in the Eurozone: The Role of Fundamental Rights’ Challenges, in EUI Working papers, 2014. 
51 The Superior Courts is an umbrella term used to refer to both the High Court and Supreme Court, who are 
capable of adjudicating on constitutional matters. Although the Court of Appeals is also capable of doing so, it is 
a recent constitutional innovation and has yet to play a central role in the development of Ireland’s constitutional 
precedent at this time. 
52 Minister for Social, Community and Family Affairs v Scanlon [2001] IESC 1, at 17.  
53 Sinnott v Minister for Education [2001] 2 IR 545. 
54 TD v Minister for Education [2001] 4 IR 259. 
55 O’Reilly v Limerick Corporation [1989] I.L.R.M. 181. 
56 On Sinnot see S. QUINLIVAN – M. KEYES, Official Indifference And Persistent Procrastination: An Analysis Of 
Sinnott, in Judicial Studies Institute Journal, 2002, available at 
www.jsijournal.ie/html/Volume%202%20No.%202/2%5B2%5D_Quinlivan&Keys_An%20Analysis%20of%20Sinnott.pdf
.  
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protection of social rights, are non-judicable before the Irish courts. This constitutes an exclusionary 
zone within which the judiciary must arguably refrain from acting and limits the extent to which they can 
determine and enforce social rights themselves by necessitating specific forms of state intervention.  
Yet this inevitably gives rise to a liminal space within which the judiciary can reasonably define the limits 
of the Oireachtas, and by extension the executive’s (as both are functionally fused in many respects) 
discretion in implementing social policy mechanisms and their specific relationship with the existing 
rights within the Constitutional text without violating the intent of Article 45. In this respect, the judiciary 
could distinguish between the protection of a specific social right, and the mechanism through which the 
Oireachtas gives this right effect. For example, recognising that there is a general right to education 
contained within the Constitutional text, or even that there my be specific obligations in providing 
educational services to marginalised/vulnerable groups does not necessitate that a particular policy or 
mechanism be implemented. It does of course lead to the potential restriction of the policy choices and 
mechanisms available, but without directing the Oireachtas or executive to adopt specific measures or 
unduly restricting the choices available to them. Instead however, the judiciary has been predisposed in 
many instances to simply recuse itself from even engaging with such distinctions, and thus allows the 
Oireachtas and executive a large remit in defining the bounds of a constitutional right as well as the 
mechanisms through which it is enforced. 
In this context, the most substantive changes in social welfare, namely the cut to various social benefits 
and entitlements by the Irish executive during the crisis, have had a disproportionate impact on an already 
fragile system of protection. The austerity measures described above had a serious impact on the most 
vulnerable in society57: those under 25, single parents, and low-income multi-parent families with 
children58. Both of the latter would leading to a double-retrenchment of social welfare provision for 
single/lone parents in particular, most of whom are women59. An analysis of governmental statistics, for 
example, places lone/single mothers at 186,284 and lone fathers at 29,031 in 201160. Barry and Conroy 
note that these lone parent households are 35% more likely to fall into poverty as a result of the constant 
cuts to their social welfare entitlements and the desire to drive those with children over the age of seven 
                                                          
57 Finally, when the ESRI reviewed their initial findings which argued that the distribution of social welfare cuts 
were affecting higher wage brackets/socio-economic groupings disproportionately for relative or real incomes, 
they found that the lowest 10% had experienced an 18.4 point cut to the same, whereas the next largest group, the 
top 10% only experienced an 11.4 point cut. See T. CALLAN – B. NOLAN – C. KEANE – M. SAVAGE – J. 
WALSH, Crisis, Response and Distributional Impact: The Case of Ireland, in ESRI Working Paper, n.456/2013, p. 9. 
58 R. HICK, From Celtic Tiger to Crisis: Progress, Problems and Prospects for Social Security in Ireland, in Social Policy and 
Administration, n.4/2014. 
59 www.oneparent.ie/CSO-Statistics-On-Lone-Parent-Families-2011.pdf , (accessed 13/08/2015). 
60 Ibid. 
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towards paid-employment61. Mary Murphy has further highlighted that the social consequences of the 
Irish economic and social crisis have been severe, but that this has again been especially pronounced for 
women, particularly those who are in additionally marginalised groups62. In a general sense, the level of 
material deprivation across Irish society approached 23% in 2010, with almost 8% of the population 
suffering from severe material deprivation63. Finally, when the ESRI reviewed their initial findings which 
argued that the distribution of social welfare cuts were affecting higher wage brackets/socio-economic 
groupings disproportionately for relative or real incomes, they found that the lowest 10% had 
experienced an 18.4 point cut to the same, whereas the next largest group, the top 10% only experienced 
an 11.4 point cut64. That these very groups would be targeted in any way, let alone so disproportionately 
given their relatively vulnerability arguably contrasts with the Constitution and the obligations it either 
sets outs or infers65.  
There have been thus far been relatively few judicial cases challenging governmental changes that have 
materially affected social rights during or arising from the crisis. It those that have been brought before 
the Courts however, the judiciary has invoked the principle of separation of powers and, as has always 
been the case in matters of social policy, has shaped precedent to ensure that the government enjoys the 
widest remit in relation to economic and social concerns. The famous “post-crisis” case of J. & J. 66 
provides a notable example. The case concerned a group of pharmacists who had negotiated certain 
services to and on behalf of the government in return for certain rates of remuneration. With a deepening 
economic recession affecting the country, the executive sought to cut these rates of remuneration below 
a certain threshold in order to meet its cost cutting objectives. The issue remained however that the 
pharmacists in question believed that these new rates and conditions were inadequate, and would risk the 
very viability of their business. With this in mind, they argued that their constitutional right to earn a 
livelihood was at risk, and that the government should be held to account. The High Court however, in 
protecting the government’s right to act unilaterally, held that this was not a constitutional case, as the 
rates of remuneration should be dealt with under contract law. Whilst this might seem adequate in other 
circumstances, where the necessary cuts would likely lead to their insolvency, a constitutional issue has 
                                                          
61 U. BARRY – P. CONROY, Ireland in Crisis 2008-2012: Women, austerity and inequality, National Women’s Council 
of Ireland (NWCI) and Think Tank on Social Change (TASC) (October 2012). 
62 M.P. MURPHY, Gendering the Narrative of the Irish Crisis, in Irish Political Studies, n.30:2/2015. 
63 IRISH CENTRAL STATISTICS OFFICE, Survey on Income and Living Conditions (SILC): Preliminary Results 2010 
(2011) at www.cso.ie, (accessed 21/08/2015). 
64 T. CALLAN – B. NOLAN – C. KEANE – M. SAVAGE – J. WALSH, Crisis, Response and Distributional Impact: 
The Case of Ireland, cit. 
65 U. BARRY – P. CONROY, Ireland in Crisis 2008-2012: Women, austerity and inequality’, cit. 
66 J. & J. Haire & Co. Ltd v Minister for Health, HC, 17 December 2009. 
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indeed been raised. Yet the Court sought to ensure that the government was not constrained by any 
judicial authority in this respect, due to their extreme reticence at engaging with and recognising any kind 
of economic or social rights accruing to citizens. This line of reasoning was reaffirmed in McKenzie67, 
which questioned the right of the executive to make cuts to the budget of the Irish Defence Forces 
unilaterally and without consultation from the Permanent Defence Forces’ union68. The Court ultimately 
decided that there was no inherent right to consultation, and that such cuts were completely legitimate. 
In Hall v Minister for Finance69, the High Court further dismissed a challenge by a private citizen to 
procedures adopted by the Minister for Finance to support financial institutions. 
Looking beyond the level of self-restraint on the part of the Irish Superior Courts in reviewing measures 
implemented by the executive that impact on social rights claims, it is undeniable that the very nature of 
the MoUs and the levels of austerity they mandate is also problematic in allowing social rights to be 
vindicated. In addition, as O’Donovan argues, these austerity-led “rescue packages” would risk violating 
the EU Chart of Fundamental Rights and its more progressive social measures70. Initially, the Pringle71 
case found that treaties or agreements signed outside the main EU structures are not subject to the 
Charter based on a strict reading of Article 50(1). Therefore even treaties such as the Treaty Establishing 
the European Stability Mechanism is outside the purview of the Charter as it is a treaty between Member 
States, and not with the EU itself. Treaties or agreements such as the Irish bailout package would likely 
never invoke the Charter, as it is even more removed from the structures of the Union. Recently however, 
Ledra Advertising Ltd72 saw the CJEU refine this principle. Whilst such agreements might fall outside of 
the EU's competences, it is possible for a Union citizen to bring an action against the Commission or 
Central Bank for a violation of their fundamental rights, including those within the Charter based on 
non-contractual liability. Consequently, where there has been a serious breach of a right and that breach 
can be imputable to the conduct of either the Commission or the ECB, a citizen may be rewarded with 
damages. Unfortunately however, bringing an action based for example on the derogation of social rights 
                                                          
67 McKenzie v Minister for Finance & Ors [2010] IEHC 461, 30 November 2010. 
68 These changes were communicated to the Defence Forces via circular and implemented via “Defence Force 
Regulation S.3 Amendments - Amendment 343 of 2009” and “Defence Force Regulation S.3 Amendments - 
Amendment 344 of 2009”. 
69 [2013] IEHC 39. 
70 D. O’DONOVAN, The Insulation of Austerity: The Charter of Fundamental Rights and European Union Institutions, 16 
May 2013, at humanrights.ie/uncategorized/the-insulation-of-austerity-the-charter-of-fundamental-rights-and-european-union-
institutions/, (accessed 18/08/2015). 
71 Case C-370/12, Pringle v. Ireland, 27 November 2012 not yet published. On this case see ex multis B. DE WITTE 
– T. BEUKERS, The European Court of Justice Approves the Creation of the European Stability Mechanism outside the EU 
Legal Order: Pringle, in Common Market Law Review, n.50/2013, p. 805. 
72 Joined Cases C‑8/15 P to C‑10/15 Ledra Advertising Ltd, Andreas Eleftheriou, Eleni Eleftheriou, Lilia Papachristofi, 
Christos Theophilou, and Eleni Theophilou v European Commission and European Central Bank ECLI:EU:C:2016:701. 
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as a result of austerity implemented based on a MoU would face significant hurdles. Firstly, the 
requirement that the breach of a right be directly imputable to the EU’s institutions may be extremely 
hard to establish. A MoU may necessitate austerity, but the way in which it is imposed is primarily a 
matter for the relevant Member State. Establishing responsibility is therefore highly problematic. 
Secondly, Ledra itself dealt with the potential breach of the right to property as proscribed in Article 17(1) 
of the Charter, and the Court found that no violation had occurred. The Court also argued that some 
violations may be proportionate, and proving a serious violation has occurred may be equally arduous. 
Finally, non-contractual liability may not be a suitable avenue for such challenges, as it can be procedurally 
burdensome, and the potential reward of damages would not have the same implications as, for example, 
an action for annulment. Inevitably, the consequences of this new judgment is that in principle austerity 
may be challenged, but the chances of success are low and the rewards are limited. 
 
3.2. Austerity and Worker’s Rights  
Social Partnership, was a key feature of the Celtic Tiger period73. It took the form of tripartite agreements 
made between the executive, the main representatives of business employers (The Irish Business and 
Employers Confederation (IBEC) and the Construction Industry Federation (CIF) usually), and the Irish 
Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU) which acts as an umbrella organisation for the majority of the trade 
unions active within Ireland. Since 1987 when social partnership was formulated, seven such agreements 
have been made, including but not limited to: The Programme for Competitiveness and Work (PCW, 
1993-1996); Partnership 2000 (P2000, 1996-2000); The Programme for Prosperity and Fairness (PPF, 
2000-2003); and Sustaining Progress (SP, 2003-2006). Until the arrival of the economic crisis in 2008, 
there had long been peace between the executive, trade unions and employers’ representatives, as each 
sought to ensure continued prosperity and stability through the enforcement of the corporatist 
agreements made between them. As Arrighi et al. note, the interests of capital or employers are naturally 
at odds with those of society74, as they rarely, if ever, seek to achieve social objectives. Instead, they simply 
seek to ensure that their maximum profit is made off their initial investment75. 
                                                          
73 T. REIDY, After six years of austerity, Ireland’s coalition government has little room to manoeuvre, in EUROPP Blog, LSE 
(8th May 2013) at blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2013/05/08/ireland-coalition-austerity/, (accessed 28.08/2015). 
74 G. ARRIGHI – TK HOPKINS – I WALLERSTEIN, Anti-Systemic Movements, New York, 1989, p. 3. 
75 During this period, trade unions were in reality experiencing a steady decline. Whereas in the 1980s union 
membership accounted for up to 62% of the workforce, by 2007 this had declined to 31%, half of its previous 
high. Although much of this can be attributed to the sharp increase in the number of non-unionised international 
corporations situating within Ireland during the Celtic Tiger, the increased use of human resources and the 
individualisation of employment law were also contributing factors. See The Irish Times, “Membership down to 
31% of workers, notes CSO” (25th January 2010). 
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However social partnership inevitably ended almost immediately after the crisis impacted on the Irish 
economy. In 2008, the government/executive acted unilaterally to enforce cuts and changes in conditions 
on public sector employers in the annual budget without the agreement of ICTU. In December of 2009, 
IBEC pulled out of further negotiations with ICTU on further pay freezes to be implemented, believing 
that further agreements would be made on a case by case, or enterprise by enterprise basis76. This is not 
surprising, and Doherty notes that this process was completely voluntary and based upon mutual trust 
rather than any overt legality (although agreements reached could become legally binding if passed by the 
houses of the Oireachtas)77. He further argues that the process was based more on conciliation than actual 
compromise78. as the outcomes were still determined by the executive itself and it similarly retained the 
ability to ignore them if it chose to do so. Unions in particular, as represented by ICTU, merely worked 
within the parameters of what was permissible to achieve any measure that might be beneficial to their 
constituents. This seems to go hand in hand with the “supremacy” of the executive as outlined in the 
preceding sections. Whilst neither expressly deals with social partnership per se, both go towards the 
unquestioned view that the executive should have a wide prerogative to act unilaterally in the economic 
and social policy fields, as well as the weak bargaining position of any party attempting to engage in 
discourse with the executive. 
Yet despite this increasing vulnerability as social partnership disintegrated as a policy-making structure 
and the weakness of trade unions under Irish law, the Superior Courts in two separate decisions eroded 
their position even further. John Grace Fried Chicken Ltd79 firstly found joint labour committees (JLCs), i.e. 
committees which sought to make sectoral labour agreements and functioned as a smaller form of social 
partnership, to constitute an unconstitutional delegation of power away from the Oireachtas under Article 
15.2.1 IC. The executive then sought to reformulate the way in which JLCs created such agreements 
within the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act 201280, which was part of the reform of the labour 
market envisaged in the MoUs. However, a further application to the Supreme Court struck down the 
relevant section of the Industrial Relations Act 1946 in its entirety. These decisions create a dichotomy 
where a large degree of autonomy is afforded to the executive in acting on behalf of the legislature, but 
                                                          
76 See Industrial Relations News, n.1/2010, p. 3. See also A. KERR, Social Rights In Crisis In the Eurozone. Work Rights 
in Ireland, in C. KILPATRICK – B. DE WITTE, Social Rights in Times of Crisis in the Eurozone: The Role of Fundamental 
Rights’ Challenges, in EUI Working papers, 2014. 
77 M. DOHERTY, It Must Have Been Love… But it’s Over Now: The Crisis and Collapse of Social Partnership in Ireland, in 
Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research, n.3/2011), p. 374. See also M. DOHERTY, Austerità e diritti del lavoro 
in Europa: una filastrocca irlandese?, in Rivista giuridica del lavoro e della previdenza sociale, n. 3/2015. 
78 Ibid, 376. 
79 John Grace Fried Chicken Ltd v Catering Joint Labour Committee [2011] IEHC 277; [2011] 3 I.R. 211. 
80 (Act No. 32/2012) (Ir.), available at www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2012/act/32/enacted/en/pdf.  
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not to trade unions in enforcing reasonable working conditions and pay agreements on a sectoral basis 
when their method of doing so at a societal level, social partnership, is no longer available to them in any 
meaningful way. Whilst the most recent Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act 201581 has created a 
system within such agreements can be registered once more, it remains possible that this too might be 
deemed constitutionally questionable if the same argument can be put forward.  
 
4. The second track: the Constitutional Reform 
4.1 . The Constitutional Amendment Procedure in a Nutshell 
Before discussing the specific process of constitutional reform initiated in 2010, it is worth recalling the 
main features of the constitutional revision in Ireland. The procedure for constitutional amendment in 
Ireland is laid down in Article 46 IC. It necessitates a referendum be held where substantive changes are 
to be made to the formal written text, after having been passed by both houses (the Dail and the Seanad) 
of the Irish parliament (the Oireachtas). Any amendment of any kind to the formal text, be it a repeal, 
variation or alteration to the Irish Constitution necessitates the holding of this popular referendum or 
plebiscite. In particular, Art. 46(2) IC requires this process be initiated by the Dáil, the lower chamber of 
Ireland’s bicameral parliamentary structure, before being endorsed by a majority vote of both houses and 
then put before the public in the form of a popular referendum. The formal Bill put to referendum must 
be marked as “An Act to Amend the Constitution”82 and must contain no other proposals83. As Ryan 
observes, “[b]ecause the Government As Ryan observes, “[b]ecause the Government usually has majority 
support in the Dáil, it is practically impossible to initiate a constitutional amendment without 
Government support”84. 
Casey believes that “since 25 June 1941 the constitution has been a rigid one”85, with few substantive 
amendments being made over time. Numerically speaking, this might not necessarily appear to be the 
case, as between 1937, when the Constitution was enacted and 2011, when FG and the Labour Party 
took office, 28 amendments had been attempted by the executive86. However, whilst it might appear 
                                                          
81 (Act No. 27/2015) (Ir.), available at www.djei.ie/en/Legislation/Legislation-Files/Industrial-Relations-Amendment-Act-
2015.pdf.  
82 Ibid, Article 46.3 IC. 
83 Article 46.4 IC. 
84 F. RYAN, Ireland’s Marriage Referendum: A Constitutional Perspective, in DPCEOnline, n. 2/2015.  
85 J. CASEY, Changing the Constitution: Amendment and Judicial Review, in B. FARRELL, De Valera’s Constitution and 
Ours, Dublin, 1988, p. 153. 
86 The Department of the Environment, Community and Local Government, Referendum Results 1937 – 2013, 
available on line at www.environ.ie/. In a small number of cases more than one proposed amendment has used the 
same numbering, meaning that the total number of proposed amendments is in fact slightly higher than the formal 
28 in this instance allows for. 
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numerically significant, it does not hold true when viewed from a substantive perspective. The first two 
Amendments were passed using the transitory provisions of the constitution, meaning that no 
referendum was necessitated87. They dealt with the definition of emergency powers during times of war 
(whilst reaffirming state neutrality)88, and structural changes in order to tighten the key provisions already 
in place, rendering them purely procedural in nature89. Five further referendum have been held on the 
issue of abortion (with many dealing with ancillary issues raised by their predecessors)90. O’Mahony 
however believes that the initial prohibition on abortion introduced in the first of these amendments was 
entirely unnecessary91 due to the presumption of the right to life of the unborn being established in 
McGee92, G v An Bord Uchtála93, Norris94, and Finn95. Seven referendum have been held on altering the 
voting system or voting regulation96, two on divorce97, with a further eight referendum98 on EU Treaties. 
In the case of Crotty99, which questioned the ratification of the Single European Act through ordinary 
legislation, it was held by the Irish Supreme Court that constitutional amendments in this regard were 
only necessary where significant changes were being made to the EU Treaties. Without discussing these 
cases in detail, this form of constitutional amendment demonstrates a propensity for repetition and 
executive control rather than a real impetus for structural change.  
 
4.2. Reform By Way of Convention 
As mentioned above, the 2011 general election saw both of the eventual coalition partners make a 
concerted effort to signal a normative shift away from the values which might have contributed to the 
Irish economy’s downfall. The Labour Party in particular, went so far as to suggest in its manifesto that 
it would instigate a new constitutional convention, through which the public would propose and later 
adopt an entirely new constitutional text. The Convention would provide an explicit remit for political 
reform in all of the areas altered and which had been supported by the wider public through a referendum. 
                                                          
87 M. FORDE, Constitutional Law in Ireland, Dublin, 1987, p. 9. 
88 First Amendment of the Constitution Act, 1939 www.irishstatutebook.ie/1939/en/act/cam/0001/index.html. 
89 Second Amendment of the Constitution Act, 1941 www.irishstatutebook.ie/1941/en/act/cam/0002/index.html. 
90 The 8th, 12th, 13th, 14th and 25th amendments found in n12 at 34, 44, 46, 48, and 68. 
91 C. O’MAHONY, Repealing the Eighth Amendment: As Simple as it Sounds?, in constitutionproject.ie/?p=380. 
92 McGee v. A.G. & Anor [1973] IESC 2; [1974] IR 284 (19 December 1973), 312.  
93 G v An Bord Uchtála [1980] IR 32, 69. 
94 Norris v. A.G. [1983] IESC 3; [1984] IR 36 (22 April 1983), 103. 
95 Finn v Attorney General [1983] IR 154, 160. 
96 The 3rd, 4th, 7th, 9th and 20th amendments, found in n12 at 18, 20, 22, 26, 32, 36, 60. The 3rd and 4th have 
been used for more than one referendum in terms of numbering. 
97 The 10th and 15th amendments, ibid at 38 and 50. 
98 The 3rd, 10th, 11th, 18th, 24th, 26th, 28th, ibid at 24, 40, 42, 56, 66, 70, 74, 76. The 28th amendment was run as 
two referenda using the same numbering. 
99 Crotty v An Taoiseach [1987] IESC 4, [1987] IR 713. 
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This type of constitutional convention is far more symbolically important. It creates a “constitutional 
moment”100 whereby the public consciously engage in deliberation, and through the battling of opposing 
normative or ideological forces, reach a consensus on what society’s values will be going forward101. Fine 
Gael by contrast placed a much larger emphasis on structural reform, arguing that parliamentary 
committees should have more power devolved to them by the executive, that these committees should 
have constitutional standing and that women should enjoy a greater degree of representation in 
parliament102. Its only explicit and entirely constitutional reforms in line with the promises made by the 
Labour were a Citizens Assembly dealing exclusively with electoral reform, and a “Constitutional Day” 
to be held within 12 months of taking office where a series of constitutional reforms would all be voted 
upon103. FG’s Citizens Assembly therefore varied significantly in so far as its remit for outlining any 
potential reforms were limited solely to the area of electoral law, meaning that they adopted a heavily 
controlled, top-down, executive-driven model of constitutional reform versus that of the Labour Party. 
Its composition however was to include 100 members of the general public104, whereas the Labour Party’s 
was to be comprised of 90 members: 30 from the general public, 30 elected representatives, and 30 from 
civil society organisations. Both therefore involved some degree of “steering” on the part of the executive, 
with FG focused on controlling the initial remit, and the Labour Party focused on input during the 
process itself, as well as in which civil society organisations would be invited to take part. 
The eventual compromise reached within the Programme for Government made once both parties 
agreed to form a governing coalition, leant heavily in favour of FG’s manifesto proposal for a Citizens 
Assembly, rather than on the wider, loftier ambitions of the Labour Party’s Constitutional Convention. 
Although it adopted the moniker of a Constitutional Convention, its scope was limited to several specific 
areas: a review of the electoral system, a reduction in the length of the presidential term of office and 
when its election would be held, a provision for same-sex marriage/marriage equality, removing 
patriarchal provisions regarding a women’s role in the family home105, removing blasphemy from the 
Constitution106, a possible reduction in the voting age, and, time permitting, any other matters deemed 
                                                          
100 M.W. MCCONNELL, The Forgotten Constitutional Moment, in Constitutional Commentary, n.11/1994, pp. 115-144. 
McConnell in outlining the theory argues that constitutional moments can also be defined more by their 
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significant by the Convention107. This form of agenda setting allows for a large degree of executive control 
before the Convention has even had the opportunity to deliberate, as they are functionally limited to 
handling specific measures, and additional issues only where these specific measures have been addressed 
and sufficient time remains.  
Its creation was subsequently ratified by parliamentary motion in July 2012108. The ultimate form adopted 
was again, more in line with FG’s proposal due not only to its discreet and clearly delineated remit, but 
also in its 100 person composition109. These 100 individuals, however, were further broken down into an 
individual chairperson chosen by the executive, 66 randomly chosen citizens, an individual representative 
of each of the parties in the Northern Ireland Assembly, and representatives from both houses of 
parliament110. Although it utilised a deliberative model, whereby each participant would be involved in 
the overall process before a consensus was reached, it also necessitated that specific recommendations 
be made within two months of the first public deliberation, and general recommendations no later than 
one year from the same111. This again, goes towards the level of control placed upon it by the executive 
and practical, temporal constraints imposed in reaching any findings, making it difficult, albeit not 
impossible, for the Convention to invoke the final provision to deliberate on any other matters that it 
deemed of significant importance from a constitutional perspective. In order to compensate for this short 
timeframe, the Convention adopted a very concise procedure during its meetings. The Convention’s 
chairperson outlined this as follows: “each meeting had three components: presentation by experts of 
papers which had been circulated in advance; debate between groups advocating on either side of an 
issue; and roundtable discussions involving facilitators and notetakers. On Sunday morning the members 
considered again the discussions of the previous day and voted on a ballot paper which reflected the 
details of the debate”112. Again, that this process culminates within a two-day period, and the allocation 
of preferences towards or against a potential reform does not necessarily equal a deliberative model. 
Whilst voters within the Convention may have been able to add additional detail to their ballot, it leans 
more on the aggregation of votes than on substantive debate. This invariably makes it easier for the 
executive to act on these preferences, but also ensures a greater degree of control, as the initial agenda-
setting in terms of the Convention’s remit does not lead to a vast multiplicity of outcomes, or complex 
suggestions for reform. Instead, the executive is able to interpret these preferences to some degree, and 
                                                          
107 Programme for Government, 2011-2016, p. 17, available at www.taoiseach.gov.ie. 
108 Constitutional Convention: Motion, Tuesday, 10 July 2012, Dáil Éireann, Debate Vol. 772, No. 1. 
109 Constitutional Convention, Terms of Reference www.constitution.ie/Documents/Terms_of_Reference.pdf. 
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argue that any alterations are made merely to reflect the realities of the constitutional text. In this way, 
they are potentially “filling in the blanks”, but blanks that are by design placed there due to the system 
put in place by the executive at first instance. 
The clearest example of this is that the Convention dealt with the potential alteration of the electoral 
system for parliamentary elections of the Dáil, the lower house. This has previously been put to 
referendum on two separate occasions, with a further five referendums on ancillary issues dealing with 
extending the voting franchise, etc. Whilst both of these referenda were held relatively early on in the 
history of the Irish state, it has also been examined by the Constitutional Review Group of 1996113, with 
the presumption remaining that the electoral system has popular support and requires careful 
consideration before any amendments be carried out114. Arguably, the short timeframe allotted to the 
Convention on the determining the issue does not match this criteria. The 7th Report reiterated even 
more clearly that no such change was necessary or desirable115. Similarly, the reduction in the voting age 
by 1 year, from 18 years of age to 17, follows this established pattern of holding referendums on technical 
aspects of voting. Whilst it might also enfranchise and politicise a new segment of society, the proposed 
change is also unlikely to be of any great significance electorally speaking, if it even reaches a referendum. 
In relation to the constitutional provision relating to a woman’s life in the family home which was also 
to be considered by the Convention, the 1996 Review Group quite plainly suggest that this be deleted 
from the constitutional text due to its unnecessary nature in the formal text116. The Tenth Review held 
that if it were to be retained, the provision should at least be made gender-neutral, and even that the 
socio-economic nature of this right might be used to help better provide for families117. Finally, in relation 
to the constitutional prohibition on blasphemy, both the 1996 and 2008 Joint Committee on the 
Constitution looking expressly at this issue both deemed it to be inappropriate and worthy of removal118. 
The only issue arising since the 2008 was the 2009 Defamation Act119, which sought to provide a 
legislative basis for the prohibition on blasphemy, but this does not alter that its removal has been 
endorsed on two separate occasions by previous constitutional review groups, one immediately preceding 
its enactment. All of these measures contribute again to the view that the executive engaged in a form of 
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agenda-setting that delegated already settled, or substantively unimportant issues to the Constitutional 
Convention for determination. 
In the final recommendations, it must also be noted that the majority of participants believed the period 
of time allotted to be too short, and would have enjoyed more time to engage with the intricacies of the 
problems discussed120. Further, 100% of the participants noted that a second convention should be held, 
although only after the original recommendations had been considered by the executive121, as it is the 
prerogative of the executive to deem any findings worthy of bringing forward for referendum. In this 
respect, this is also an additional check on the power of the Convention to make any lasting findings in 
a practical sense, as the executive is free to ignore those which do not fit with their legislative agenda. 
Comparatively speaking, such Citizens’ Assemblies have been utilised across the world, with the nearest 
comparators to Ireland being utilised in Canada: once in British Colombia, and once in Ontario. Both of 
these expressly dealt with the issue of electoral reform as the original FG manifesto outlined. Although 
it is not possible for the purposes of this analysis to engage with these two examples in any significant 
way, sufficed to say, Pal notes that similar procedural issues raised in the Canadian context severely limit 
the potential scope and likely transformative effect stemming from such Citizens’ Assemblies122. From 
an Irish perspective, a Constitutional Convention should ensure that the Constitution is brought closer 
to the ordinary citizen, as envisaged by Article 46 IC. Yet despite the promises made in both the FG and 
Labour Party election manifestos, neither is willing to release its control as the executive on what 
ultimately goes to popular plebiscite.  
 
4.3. A Conventional Allegory: Marriage Equality 
Despite the numerous recommendations made by the Constitutional Convention to the executive, and 
its airing of additional issues deemed of constitutional importance, only one potentially substantive issue 
has been put to referendum: the same-sex marriage, or marriage equality referendum. From a more 
general perspective, this is far from unexpected, as the remaining specifically enunciated issues that were 
put to the Convention had either been put to referendum already, or had already had recommendations 
made by other appointed bodies. Similarly, there is also cause to believe that the issue of marriage equality 
did not necessitate constitutional amendment at first instance, but was politically determined. Further, 
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recommendations, 2.2, timeframe www.constitution.ie/AttachmentDownload.ashx?mid=55f2ba29-aab8-e311-a7ce-
005056a32ee4, (accessed 04/05/2015). 
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the executive expressly noted that no further referendums would be held before the 2016 general election, 
other than the Marriage Equality Referendum and the secondary referendum on reducing the age 
restriction on presidential candidates from 35 to 21123. Whilst the latter124 was also an issue proposed by 
the Convention125, the lack of debate generated on it and support given to it by the executive quickly led 
to it being named the “forgotten”126 and “invisible”127 referendum. It was also an ancillary issue raised 
during the debate on the office of the presidency, meaning that it was in no way substantive, merely a 
procedural hurdle to running for that particular elected office. Due to this lack of debate, it was also 
resoundingly defeated at the polls with over 70% of all voters voting against it128, demonstrating an overall 
lack of support from within the executive to ensure its passage. By contrast the Marriage Equality 
referendum passed by a margin of 62% voting in favour of the provision, making it the first sovereign 
nation state to pass such a measure by popular plebiscite129. However, as with the previously mentioned 
referendums on citizenship and abortion, it is difficult to determine if a constitutional amendment130 was 
even necessary. Both O’Mahony131 and Daly132 note that this is not the case, with Daly in particular 
succinctly emphasising that the drive to constitutionalise this issue rests so where between political 
pragmatism, and the need to ensure consensus on the issue by remitting it to the Constitutional 
Convention133. 
                                                          
123 RTE News, Taoiseach rules out blasphemy referendum, 12 January 2015 www.rte.ie/news/2015/0112/671900-news-in-
brief/, (accessed 06/05/2015). 
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2015. 
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The most recent case of Zappone134, whereby a lesbian couple who had married in a Canadian civil 
ceremony argued that the Irish tax code discriminated against them based on their marital status by not 
recognising the same, had in reality alluded to the Courts’ likely decision on this issue if the executive 
were to proceed ordinary legislation. It recognised that the then current interpretation of marriage within 
the Irish constitution was limited to opposite-sex couples, but the Court went further in arguing that this 
definition is capable of evolution, based on the prevailing values of modern society established within 
McGee135. Whilst the Court reaffirmed that the contemporary conception was predicated on opposite-sex 
couples, it arguably allowed this issue to be dealt with through legislation extending marital franchise sub-
constitutionally to same-sex couples as this would not only signal a shift in the prevailing values per 
McGee. but also that it would even benefit from the presumption of constitutionality that affixes to any 
new legislation passed by both houses of parliament similar to the Civil Partnership Act 2010.136 Even if 
a challenge were made against such legislation, the overriding tests for derogations against the institution 
against marriage arise in the cases of Murphy137 and MhicMathúna138. The tests set out in both, require that 
any alterations to the constitutional interpretation of marriage must not penalise those in existing 
marriages, or induce someone to not marry in the future. Neither of these tests would be violated by the 
legislative extension of the right to marry to same-sex couples, as the extension of this same right does 
not impact on opposite-sex couples in either way. In this respect, whilst it might diverge from the 
constitutional view of marriage as being between opposite-sex couples, it does nothing to negatively 
impact on that right to make such a legislative act unconstitutional. Therefore the largest inducement to 
hold a referendum on this issue is that it firstly shifts the burden from the executive in legislating for the 
right to the public in supporting it via the referendum mechanism, and that it validates the holding the 
Constitutional Convention itself. Both are purely political factors adopted by the executive, again 
demonstrating the executive-driven nature of constitutional reform, and the propensity to hold 
referendums on purely political, not constitutional grounds.  
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
Following on from a severe and long-lasting economic crisis, the Irish economy has shown signs of 
recovery, and of overall growth. At the time of the writing of this contribution, FG has returned to power 
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in the form of a significantly reduced minority coalition government139. The FG-Labour coalition lost 27 
and 30 seats respectively, with Labour in particular retaining a mere 7 of 157 seats in the Dáil140. Their 
new coalition partners are the Independent Alliance, a somewhat loose grouping of right-wing 
parliamentarians, and FF, who have refused to enter government directly with FG due to their historical 
and supposed ideological differences, but without whom FG would not be able to achieve their political 
agenda141. Despite these significant electoral loses, Ireland has thus been heralded as the success story, 
the shining example that proves that austerity is the right way to go, and that governments who have 
instigated such policies can remain in power, albeit in a far reduced capacity. In addition, although, other 
EU countries, in primis Italy, have undergone a process of constitutional reform, Ireland has been certainly 
the first (and the only one) to call a Constitutional Convention. The Irish executive not only successfully 
navigated through its bailout package, but also succeeded in advancing civil rights through the “Marriage 
Equality” referendum. However, the twin-tracked approach to exiting the crisis led by the executive has 
a dark side which is not possible to ignore.  
First, the austerity agenda made the executive substantially stronger, without any formal change to its 
constitutional procedures. In reality, it diminished the already minimal possibility for the legislature, 
affected parties or civil society at large to interfere in any way. The Irish courts have also retrenched even 
further away from the rhetoric of social rights, by granting an ever wide margin of appreciation to the 
executive in implementing a highly unequal, austerity agenda. This chapter attempts to show how the 
supremacy of the executive was consolidated not only externally by the Troika, but also internally by the 
Irish courts. Ireland has always had the potential from a constitutional perspective to give effect to 
economic and social rights, as many such rights are inferred if not overtly referred to within the 
constitutional text itself. Yet the Superior Courts in interpreting these rights has leaned heavily on a 
specific interpretation of Article 45 IC, which gives an almost exclusive right to determine the bounds of 
social rights to the legislative branch, and due to the fusion of the legislative and executive branches, the 
executive. With regards to labour rights, newly emergent precedent from the courts have inevitably 
reduced the bargaining power of the labour force and trade unions in combatting such austerity to the 
benefit of government. In particular, with the breakdown of social partnership, the Courts have adopted 
a rather critical approach to agreements between employers and trade unions at a time of a great need, 
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and allowed the executive to act unilaterally on economic matters by eschewing any requirement for them 
to engage with stakeholders. The judgments discussed above expand the exclusionary zone for non-
governmental or non-executive parties to in any way shape public policy, making it even more difficult 
for trade unions to exercise their own social right against government and organised capital for 
redistributive purposes. This view was somewhat reiterated in Collins v Minister for Finance & Ors142, where 
a parliamentarian challenged the executive’s issuance of promissory notes to banks as a guarantee at the 
start of the crisis. The plaintiff questioned the Minister’s ability to do so without parliamentary approval, 
and the Court was quick to quash the motion based on its ability to “either sap[ping] the ability of the 
State to borrow money on international capital markets or, at least, introducing a new risk premium which 
would have to be reflected in more elevated bond yields in respect of Irish sovereign debt”143.  
The executive has been equally reluctant to give to the courts the task of creating a redistributive State to 
it. It has for example yet to introduce a bill for the amendment of the constitution based on the 
Constitutional Convention’s recommendation that such rights be acknowledged and made judicable 
within the constitutional text. It had previous under the auspices of the Constitutional Review Group, 
argued against the inclusion of such rights144.  
Secondly, the Constitutional Convention proposed by the previous FG/Labour Party coalition sought 
to instigate wide-ranging constitutional reform, and also the inclusion of ordinary citizens within a 
deliberative, democratic model. The reality however was the executive retained its top-down, control 
based model of this new process, by directing it to consider already settled or deliberated upon 
constitutional questions, and in ensuring that the Marriage Equality referendum was the only issue to be 
effectively put to referendum. In this way, the actual reality of constitutional reform using the Convention 
model differs greatly from the rhetorical flourishes made under its auspices. Constitutional reform in 
Ireland has followed a distinct pattern of repetition and politicisation. Repetition in that the majority of 
amendments proposed and referendums held are on identical, or ancillary questions to common themes 
such as abortion, electoral reform, or the EU. The political nature stems from the level of executive 
control over the entire process of calling a referendum under Article 46 IC and the number of 
referendums held on issues which do not necessarily require constitutional amendment, but where it is 
politically advantageous to do so. In particular, it appears that the Irish government chose not to put 
issues ratified before the Constitutional Convention such as socio-economic rights to popular plebiscite. 
Whilst issues such as the above mentioned marriage equality (i.e. constitutionalising the right to marry 
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regardless of gender), although substantive to those involved, arguably did not require utilising the 
constitutional referendum mechanism. This issue also arises with the “Children’s Rights Referendum” 
which sought to extend constitutional protections to non-traditional families. The overall blurred picture 
of the Irish bailout and reform process reveals the advancement of civil rights, and the dramatic 
contraction of social rights predicted in the Constitution, with the weakest and most vulnerable bearing 
the highest burden in terms of their relative position and personal capital. The austerity agenda came at 
the expense of the already weak Irish welfare state and those that need it most as it retrenches even 
further from where it was prior to the economic crisis.  
Of course it is difficult to suggest that civil rights changes such as this do not carry some kind of cost, be 
it in the actual administration and campaigning for such a constitutional amendment, or in actually 
implementing them. The key difference here, is that firstly, such rights do not necessarily necessitate that 
economic and social redistribution take place as these rights are based almost exclusively on “identity 
politics”. These are fundamental issues such as race, sexuality and gender which would otherwise 
exacerbate social and economic deprivation, but have instead become an apolitical way of ensuring 
progress without substantive change to existing hierarchies (be they social or economic in nature). In 
Robin’s estimation, this is due to the political right’s propensity to assume the language of its ideological 
opposite in order to secure electoral victory145. This has in turn led to the left itself consolidating around 
the same type of discourse even further where it proves successful. That both FG and Labour can both 
mutually agree on issues such as marriage equality when they supposedly sit on opposing sides of the 
ideological divide, demonstrates that these issues have little, if anything to do with substantive social 
rights or economic redistribution. It instead arguably supports Robin’s thesis that politics is now 
predicated on the politics of difference, so long as it is not due to economic disparities. In this respect, 
marriage is highly instructive as it in fact creates a private, exclusionary sphere away from government 
intervention for the persons contracting to marry. It further implies that long-term familial wealth is 
maintained within this private sphere, as its primary distribution/redistribution is chosen based on 
individual preference using inheritance laws to facilitate the same146. Feminists have also long argued that 
marriage is based upon the social subjugation of women to men, and that while the institution itself has 
changed in many ways, this hierarchy has remained147. Women are presumed to assume certain obligations 
socially or culturally which the existence of marriage reinforces. Extending the right to marry therefore 
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does not address this structural, social imbalance in any way. In addition, the executive has specifically 
sought to limit the potential redistribution it might have to engage with, therefore reducing the perceived 
cost of this new civil right. In June of 2015 the Public Service Reform Minister Brendan Howlin stated 
that public or civil servants who take part in either a civil partnership or marriage under the 2015 Bill will 
not enjoy equal rights to pension benefits as their opposite-sex counterparts due to financial concerns 
over the extra pressure it would place on the executive at present148. This means that the limited cost of 
providing true equality of treatment in this particular sphere is still too expensive for an executive more 
interested in symbolism and maintaining or exacerbating existing hierarchies than in crafting substantive 
rights. Instead, the cost was borne by the subjects of the Marriage Equality referendum, as a recent survey 
found that LGBTI people were subjected to often extreme emotional and psychological distress, with 
the majority unprepared to repeat the experience149. Thus, the cost of even the more progressive measures 
enacted by the coalition government continued to fall on the already marginalised. 
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